50 Years After Independence
(by NS Rajaram | The Hindu | March 23, 2000)
50 years after independence, India is still without recognised borders with China. While it is easy to blame China for intransigence, new information has come to light suggesting that Indian leaders also missed opportunities when favourable conditions presented themselves. They pursued a course of idealism for world peace while what the national interest demanded was flexibility and pragmatism. As a result, India today is the only country of its size without a recognised boundary. This is the picture that emerges from some new evidence that has just become known, notably in the remarkable book 'The Fate of Tibet' by the French scholar, Mr Claude Arpi (Har-Anand, New Delhi).
India's border problem is an inseparable part of the India-China- Tibet triangle. In 1950, two momentous events shook Asia and the rest of the world: one was the Chinese invasion of Tibet and the other, their intervention in the Korean war. By all canons of logic, India should have devoted the utmost attention to the immediate situation in Tibet and let interested parties, China and the US, sort it out in Korea. But the Indian leaders – Nehru in particular – got heavily involved in Korea, while paying insufficient attention to the Tibetan crisis. This lies at the root of the problem plaguing India today.
Part of the difficulty in unravelling the details is lack of access to records. The Nehru family heirs continue to exercise control over these vital documents, including those in the National Archives. But by a fortunate turn of events, many of the same records are available at the India Office in London. When India became independent, HE Richardson, British representative in Lhasa, was asked by the Nehru Government to continue as Indian representative. And Richardson sent copies of his correspondence with his new bosses in Delhi to his former superiors in London. Mr Arpi has made extensive use of them in addition to trying to obtain Tibetan records. This makes it possible to appreciate better the chain of events which led to the 1962 war.
In the years which followed the takeover of Tibet, China made several attempts to negotiate a stable border with India beginning with the northeast. Embroiled in both Tibet and Korea, with a real or perceived threat from the US-supported Chiang Kai-Shek who lay in wait in Farmosa (Taiwan), China was anxious to have a peaceful border with India. The Indian Army then had an outstanding reputation following its brilliant record in World War II, Kashmir and Korea. So the time was propitious for settling the border. But in the 1950s Nehru's interests were focussed on Korea and the Pancha Sheel. As the decade went by, China became militarily much stronger, while the Indian Army was allowed to deteriorate – in both material and morale. As a result, the opportunity to settle the boundary dispute was lost.
Misplaced Generosity: While India's interests in Tibet were allowed to suffer, the Nehru Government made a strenuous effort to gain international recognition for Mao's China. As Tibet was crumbling before the Chinese advance, bringing the great power to the borders of India, Nehru's his main concern was getting China admitted to the United Nations as a permanent member of the Security Council. This was an unrealistic goal, for China was then engaged in a war against the U.N. forces in Korea. But Nehru saw himself as an intermediary between the West and the socialist world – China and the Soviet Union.
From all this India gained little except the West's hostility. More than its later friendship with the Soviet Union, it is India's abandonment of Tibet and the sponsorship of Mao's China that soured its relationship with America.
At this crucial time in history, India's ambassador in Beijing, KM Panikkar, a communist sympathiser, went so far as to claim in 1950 that there was 'lack of confirmation' of the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and that protesting the Chinese invasion would be an "interference to India's efforts on behalf of China in the UN". Nehru also wrote, "our primary consideration is maintenance of world peace... Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China's position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action (by India) in Tibet." So the Government's highest priority apparently was not to weaken China's case in the UN Deeply disturbed by the development, Sardar Patel complained to Nehru that Panikkar "has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions." India got nothing in return for its generosity. At the very least, India could have demanded settling its border with China in return. There was ample historical and contemporary evidence to show that China respected only strength and not pacific pronouncements based on a utopian vision like the Pancha Sheel, but India failed to recognise this fact. As Mr Arpi found, "nothing would stop Nehru from going ahead with his policy of friendship with China. Over the years, the myth of the Indo-Chinese friendship would grow larger and larger, becoming a 'brotherhood', until that a day in October 1962 when Lin Biao and his PLA (People's Liberation Army) were on the Thagla Ridge in the West Kameng Division in NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh)."
The Pancha Sheel collapsed even earlier, that day in 1959 when the Dalai Lama left Tibet for exile in India. It is still seen by most Indians as a case of China exploiting Nehru's good faith by 'stabbing him in the back'. But new information shows that Nehru and Krishna Menon were informed of the Chinese incursions in Ladakh and Aksai Chin long before the public learnt of them. One can only surmise that the matter was kept secret to keep the Panch Sheel alive.
Zhou Visits: To understand this, it is necessary to appreciate the fact that what China desired most was a stable border with India. With this in view, the Premier, Zhou-en-Lai, visited India several times to fix the boundary. In short, the Chinese were prepared to accept the McMahon Line as the boundary in the east – with possibly some minor adjustments and a new name – and then negotiate the unmarked boundary in the west between Ladakh and Tibet. In effect, what Zhou-en-Lai proposed was a phased settlement, beginning with the eastern boundary. Nehru, however, wanted the whole thing settled at once. The practical minded Zhou-en-Lai found this politically impossible. And on each visit the Premier, in search of a boundary settlement, heard more about the Pancha Sheel than India's stand on the boundary. He interpreted this as intransigence on India's part.
China in fact went on to settle its boundary with Myanmar roughly along the McMahon Line following similar principles. Contrary to what the Indian public was told, the border between Ladakh (in the princely State of Kashmir) and Tibet was never clearly demarcated. As late as 1960, the Indian Government had to send survey teams to Ladakh to locate the boundary and prepare maps. But the Government kept telling the people that there was a clearly defined boundary, which the Chinese refused to accept.
What the situation demanded was a creative approach, especially from the Indian side. There were several practical issues on which negotiations could have been conducted – especially in the 1950s when India was in a relatively strong position. China needed Aksai Chin because it had plans to lay an access road from Tibet to the Xinjiang province (Sinkiang) in the west. Aksai Chin was of far greater strategic significance to China than to India. (It may be a strategic liability for India – being more expensive to maintain and harder to supply than even the Siachen Glacier). Had Nehru recognised this fact, he might have proposed a creative solution like asking for access to Mount Kailash and Manasarovar in return for our providing access to the Chinese to Aksai Chin. The issue is not whether such an agreement was possible but no solutions were proposed. The upshot was that China ignored India – including the Pancha Sheel – and went ahead with its plan to build the road through Aksai Chin.
More Mistakes: This was compounded by other errors. What the Indian public does not know is that Nehru and Krishna Menon had been fully informed of the Chinese encroachment in Aksai Chin years before it became public in 1959. Mr Arpi produces evidence showing that in 1955, an English mountaineer, Sydney Wignall, was deputed by General Thimayya to verify reports that the Chinese were laying the road through Aksai Chin. Wignall was not his only source. Shortly after the Chinese attack in 1962, this writer heard from General Thimayya that he had also sent a young officer of the MEG to Aksai Chin to confirm reports of the intrusion. When the Army brought this information to his notice, Krishna Menon, in Nehru's presence, sharply told the senior officer, who made the presentation, that he was "lapping up CIA agent provocateur propaganda." The rest in history.
Thus at a time when China was vulnerable – committed in both Korea and Tibet and with possible threats from Chiang on the mainland itself – the Indian leadership failed to take advantage of the situation to settle the boundary. Next, when the Chinese made repeated efforts to settle the border in phases beginning with the eastern boundary, the leadership again failed to respond creatively. Finally, when their intentions in Aksai Chin became clear, the Government failed to take the public into confidence and evolve a coherent policy. The years that should have been devoted to demarcating the boundary were squandered on promoting the Pancha Sheel. It is time perhaps for the country and its leaders to make a new beginning.
Friends of Tibet (INDIA),
PO Box 16674, Bombay 400050
www.friendsoftibet.org